INTRODUCTION
Over a quarter of a century since the fall of the Berlin Wall, former communist regimes have transitioned to democratic or semi-democratic regimes, although the process of becoming market economies has advanced at different rates and directions across countries. Transition economies represent a large sub-category of emerging economies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013) . Given the 25 years since 1989, it is timely to review how means of state control have changed in these transition economies.
While developed economies have seen a gradual demise of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and there has been extensive privatization in emerging economies, state capitalism is a popular choice among transition economies (Wooldridge, 2012) . Accordingly, we address the following research question: "Which forms of state control over corporations have emerged in countries that made a transition from centrally-planned to marked-based economies and what are their implications for corporate governance?" To address this question, we suggest a taxonomy of state control used to structure our literature review.
We consider the transformation of state control in transition economies focusing on the emergence of contemporary forms of state capitalism following privatizations of the 1990s. Earlier reviews focused on privatization comparing performance of state-owned and privatized companies (Estrin & Wright, 1999; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Djankov & Murrell, 2002) , but interactions between state and private sector have evolved and new forms of state control have emerged. Our motivation is driven by a lack of comprehensive reviews encompassing the evolution and variety of state control over firms and their governance implications. We fill this gap by bringing together studies scattered across several disciplines and identifying relevant theoretical perspectives that suggest positive and negative effects of state control, as summarized in Table 1 .
------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 
about here ------------------------------------
We searched for studies that examine state control and corporate governance of firms in transition economies. The first category of studies considered various mechanisms of state control: partial ownership, board of directors, veto rights, managerial incentives, loans, and regulation. The second category analyzed relationships between state control and corporate governance. We did not cover studies about performance implications of state control, these implications have been discussed by Musacchio Lazzarini, and Aguilera (2015) .
We analyzed more than a hundred articles published since 1989 focusing on peerreviewed studies (Seglen, 1994; Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse et al., 2009 ), but also included in our review books and book chapters containing significant empirical material. We did not review studies about traditional SOEs with state as the sole shareholder -such enterprises were covered by earlier reviews on privatization (Megginson & Netter, 2001 ).
Instead we focused on partial state ownership and indirect state ownerships via intermediaries. We generally refer to such firms as SOEs. Key studies representing different theoretical perspectives and different transition economies are shown in Table 2 .
------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 
about here ------------------------------------
We adopt a broad definition of 'transition economies' to include former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, former republics of the Soviet Union, and Asian countries emerging from a socialist-type command economy towards a market-based economy (China, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam) . Many of these economies have completed transition to a market economy. The countries that joined the EU -Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and Croatia in 2013 , are no longer in transition.
We mainly focus on the two largest transition economies, China and Russia (drawing some comparisons with smaller transition economies), because of the economic and political importance of SOEs in these countries and because studies overwhelmingly relate to these two countries (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan et al., 2015; Musacchio et al., 2015) . Comparing China and Russia helps identify context-specific factors affecting corporate governance of state-controlled companies. Timelines of the main events affecting state control and corporate governance in China and Russia are shown in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively.
----------------------------------------Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here ----------------------------------------
The paper is structured as follows. First, we outline a range of forms of state control going beyond dominant ownership positions, including government loans, appointments of state officials to board or top management positions, party committees, special veto rights, regulation, and business-government networks, and consider how these have evolved over time in China, Russia and other transition economies. Second, we review the literature on governance structures and processes with particular attention to board composition and independence, transparency and disclosure, and executive compensation in state-controlled firms operating in transition economies. Finally, we elaborate an agenda for future research on corporate governance implications of state control taking into account the variety of transition economies.
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MEANS OF STATE CONTROL: VARIATION AND EVOLUTION OVER TIME
Over the last 25 years, public perception and academic reasoning about the role of state in transition economies have fluctuated sharply. During the early 90s, the pro-market and antistate climate reigned following the collapse of communist regimes. Research on SOEs in transition economies during our focal period started with privatization studies (Aharoni, 1986; Ramamurti & Vernon, 1991; Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Estrin & Wright, 1999) . These studies viewed SOEs as a temporary organizational form because privatization of SOEs was widely anticipated (Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001 ). In the second half of the 1990s, initial euphoria over privatization in planned economies began to wane as the hard work of enterprise restructuring continued. Since mid-2000s, the pace of privatization and deregulation has slowed. During this period, private investors were often offered minority stakes, with the state keeping a controlling stake. A new form of state capitalism developed, influenced by increasing globalization and market-orientation. To address this transformation, a more recent literature emerged devoted to partial state ownership (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013) and other forms of state control. As the overwhelming majority of studies about state control have been conducted in China (Bruton et al., 2015) , we begin by reviewing these studies and then consider studies about state control in Russia and other transition economies.
Variation and Evolution of State Control in China
SOEs with Partial State Ownership. China took a reform approach of 'gradualism' (Wang, Guthrie, & Xiao, 2011) , preserving state control while implementing new institutional forms. In the 1980s, China decentralized state control to provincial, municipal, township and village level governments, at the same time allowing private sector emergence.
During the 1990s reforms, China's state vowed to "hold onto the big and let go of the small" 6 (zhua da fang xiao) (Fernandez & Fernandez-Stembridge, 2007) . As a result, China developed a complex system of state ownership with elaborated control mechanisms (Delios, Wu, & Zhou, 2006) . The Chinese state retained stakes (often non-controlling) in privatized medium-sized SOEs and imposed restrictions on non-state share transfers. Large SOEs remained under government control, but some were partly privatized later (Cao, Qian, & Weingast, 1999) . Gradualism had two benefits. First, it allowed the state to retain its stabilizing role. Second, the central government pushed ownership control down to localities, creating an incentive structure similar to those experienced by managers of large industrial firms.
Continuing central government commitment to support employment in SOEs implied state-owned banks usually bailed out loss-making SOEs, creating 'soft budget' constraints (Zhu, 2012) . This strategy resulted in "reform without losers" (Lau, Qian, & Roland, 2000) and helped minimize social instability and reduce resistance to reform. In contrast, central government had no commitment to support employment in township and village enterprises (TVEs). Thus, TVEs faced a much tighter budget constraint and stronger market discipline than SOEs controlled by central government. However, from the mid-1990s, central government progressively reduced commitment to support employment in SOEs, and many small and medium-sized SOEs went bankrupt or were privatized. More diversified ownership was introduced with some larger SOEs being converted into shareholding companies, with majority of shares controlled by the state.
This restructuring led to productivity growth and a decline in SOEs' share of labor (Zhu, 2012) . The Chinese government aimed at selectively fortifying SOE presence in specific industries (Nolan, 2001 ) and in developing SOEs into globally competitive firms (Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang et al., 2006) . In 2000, China launched its 'Go Global' policy, establishing some SOEs as 'national champions' and leading to SOEs 7 globalization (Thun, 2004; Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2015) . SOEs' culture became close to those of privately and foreign-owned businesses (Granrose, Huang, & Reigadas, 2000) . However, the Chinese government did not desire to completely eradicate former hierarchical structures.
A key ingredient of reforms was 'corporatization' of SOEs which meant that they fell under the jurisdiction of the 1994 Company Law, aimed at promoting corporate property rights and corporate governance structures. Corporatized SOEs were subsequently listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006) to access private and foreign capital. Moreover, China started the split-share structural reform in 2006 as a part of its program to transfer state shares in SOEs to private investors (Haveman & Wang, 2013) and to transform the corporate governance model from administrative to more marketoriented (Ralston et al., 2006) . Typically, when a Chinese SOE was listed, only a small proportion of equity was sold to private investors (Conyon & He, 2011) with the state and parent SOEs keeping voting control. Sheng and Zhao (2013) show that recently the "state advance and private retreat" phenomenon (guo jin min tui) has been gaining groundChina's government has strengthened control over SOEs with private capital being forced to withdraw from major industries, especially those related to national security.
Indirect State Ownership Control. The state maintained indirect control after corporatization as state shares were 'placed' in the State-Owned Asset Management Companies (SOAMCs); and under the control of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), charged with transforming and controlling the largest and most powerful of SOEs. SASAC was also responsible for appointing and removing top executives at SOEs, setting executive compensation, improving corporate governance and setting SOEs' operating budgets and ensuring workplace safety at SOEs (Jiang & Kim, 2015) . From 1998 to 2003 shares directly owned by the state declined from 67.3 percent to 23.5 percent, while state institutional shares (owned by SOAMCs/ SASAC) rose from 1.8 percent to 44.4 percent (Wang et al., 2011) . Researchers still have to explore how much autonomy SOAMCs enjoy.
Means of Control beyond Ownership.
In transition economies the state often supported and influenced distressed firms through soft budgets (Djankov & Murrell, 2002) .
In China, the state responded to the 2008 global financial crisis with a monetary stimulation entailing internal transfers between arms of the government, banking and corporate sectors (Deng, Morck, Wu, & Yeung, 2015) . However, monitoring of controlling shareholders by state banks was often inefficient with banks lending to firms even when firms' controlling shareholders were tunneling resources from these firms (Qian & Yeung, 2015) .
Appointments of former or current state officials to board or top management positions in China were common in the 1990s. Such political ties are used by managers to access officials and resources (Walder, 1995) . However, bureaucrats seek rents from firms and there is evidence of lower performance and growth in politically connected firms (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007) . Moreover, the effect on performance is contingent upon tie type.
Political ties to local governments can improve firm survival ('buffering') and performance ('enabling'), unlike ties to the central government (Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2014) . Such effects are also contingent upon firm's prior performance.
State involvement in listed SOEs is enabled by the often overlapping dual governance structure: the corporate board and the Party Committee (headed by its Party Secretary). Even where the two structures do not overlap, real power still flows through the Party Committee, which often simply follows Communist Party orders (Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008) . The latter also appoints CEOs of the largest SOEs.
Networks of Private and State Actors. China's economy is characterized as 'networked capitalism', involving complex partnerships between firms and state (Boisot & Child, 1996) . Decentralization processes in the 1990s led to central ministries retaining control over larger strategic SOEs and leaving smaller SOEs under interdependent control of local governments and private entrepreneurs. The connections (or quanxi) with the bureaucracy may lead to the creation of special networks for channeling resources and forging mutual partner alliances between private businesses and the state (Wank, 1995) .
Start-ups may strategically appoint outside directors to seek help in dealing with government (Chen, 2015) . State connections are associated with less severe financial constraints (Cull, Li, Sun, & Xu, 2015) . Firms are actively looking for various means of building their businessstate networks and rendering favors to government officials, for example, by engaging in corporate social responsibility that promotes social welfare (Lin, Tan, Zhao, & Karim, 2015) .
Political connections helped China's tycoons amass phenomenal wealth in real estate, finance, high tech and mining. In 2015, China had over 200 billionaires ranking second after US (Forbes, 2015) . However, contrary to Russian oligarchs, China's tycoons were mostly self-made, did not obtain their assets from privatizations, and were not former bureaucrats.
Variation and Evolution of State Control in Russia
SOEs with Partial State Ownership. Russian mass privatization in the early / mid1990s was radical compared with gradualism in China. Such aggressive privatization has been criticized as premature given weakness of the institutional infrastructure (Black, Kraakman, & Tarassova, 2000) and justified as the only feasible option given the political environment at the time (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1995) . Privatization methods in Russia favored employees and, especially, managers leading to managerial entrenchment (Filatotchev, Wright, & Bleaney, 1999) . Powerful positions of managers and weakness of corporate governance mechanisms often left the state as passive minority shareholder during the early reform period (Pistor & Turkewitz, 1996; Estrin & Wright, 1999) .
Since 2000 the state has adopted a different approach by transforming selected SOEs into profitable, rapidly expanding industry leaders and by offering minority stakes in these enterprises to private investors -such investments could bring good return but minimal control rights. This approach allowed the state to enhance control over large strategically important enterprises while divesting holdings in relatively insignificant enterprises (Chernykh, 2011) . This trend stimulated interest in the implications of dominant state ownership for minority investors (Yakovlev, 2009 (Chernykh, 2008) . These aggressive acquisition strategies of several large SOEs resulted in de facto renationalization of many enterprises that were privatized in the 1990s (Chernykh, 2011 Wright, Buck, & Filatotchev, 1998; Frye & Iwasaki, 2011) .The presence of state representatives appears persistent even when state ownership declines following privatization (Radygin, Entov, Gontmakher, Mezheraups et al., 2004) .
Studies of Russian firms with government board representatives provide evidence of collusive relationships: firms with state directors are more likely to receive state benefits and to provide services that benefit the state (Frye & Iwasaki, 2011) .
In the 1990s, the state often acted as a passive shareholder and rarely used the board as a mechanism for exercising control over management. However, in the early 2000s, the state became a more active shareholder and appointed senior government officials to the boards of SOEs. In 2011 President Medvedev initiated the removal of top government officials from the boards of directors of SOEs, but this initiative has recently been reversed. A second means of enhancing control beyond ownership occurs through veto rights provided by a 'golden share' (Frye & Iwasaki, 2011) . Golden shares were frequently used in the 1990s but more recently the Russian government has abandoned its special voting rights 12 in some SOEs. In other firms, the government increased its stake substantially thus making obsolete special voting rights provided by the golden share.
A third mechanism that allows the state to exercise influence beyond ownership is based on companies' dependence on the state as a provider of resources. Thus, the statecontrolled Vneshekonombank was providing refinancing to many large "strategically important" companies in a critical condition after the 2008 financial crisis (Radygin, 2008) .
The recipients were expected to reciprocate by avoiding massive lay-offs, salary cuts, or significant increases in output prices (Simachev & Kuzyk, 2012) . These de facto bailouts were not associated with a substantial increase in the number of SOEs (Enikolopov & Stepanov, 2013) , but provided state agencies with significant leverage over private companies to demand that they avoid taking actions with high social costs.
Fourth, regulation represents another state control channel. Limited effectiveness of the Russian government as a regulator is reflected not only in problems with enforcement of rules (Spicer & Okhmatovskiy, 2015) , but also in the practice of modifying general rules to create favorable conditions for specific companies loyal to federal or regional governments.
Such favoritism creates strong incentives for private companies to coordinate actions with government agencies to the extent that these private companies initiate large business transactions only after informal approval from government agencies (Radygin, 2008) . SOEs often rely on regulatory support from the government and this practice benefits private shareholders investing in SOEs. However, by playing simultaneously the roles of owner and regulator, the state creates conflicts of interest that perpetuate the perception of market regulations in Russia as biased and inconsistent.
Networks of Private and State Actors.
Of particular relevance to the study of state control is the relationship between the Russian top politicians and industrial tycoons 13 ('oligarchs') (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005) . When Mr. Putin came to power, he offered to accept oligarchs' ownership rights obtained through the opaque privatization process if they did not get involved in politics (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007) . Some oligarchs adapted by befriending the state and generating synergies from operating together (Melkumov, 2009 ).
The state 'authorized' these tycoons to get rich and they were inclined to cooperate with the state (Adachi, 2013) . Oligarch-owned firms were often structured as pyramids or through cross-shareholdings. In these structures, the oligarch achieved control of constituent firms via a chain of ownership relations, often including the state as another controlling shareholder.
These oligarchic-state network structures filled the institutional vacuum left by the collapsed communist economy, ensuring access to the requisite resources for investments and improving assets' productivity (Grosman & Leiponen, 2013) . However, the power of oligarchs over the companies within their control also created opportunities for tremendous private gains, often at the expense of minority shareholders and potentially to the detriment of the overall economy.
For many oligarchs, close connections to the state are rooted in their affiliation with nomenklatura circles through early careers or personal connections. Others started as 'outsiders' but over the years developed a special relationship with the state (Braguinsky, 2009 ). The oligarchs' relationships with the state also took more formal formats as exemplified by official meetings of Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Putin with the group of the most prominent oligarchs and by establishment of a powerful lobbying association, Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, representing mostly interests of large business owners (Hanson & Teague, 2005) .
The emergence of networks where private and state actors were interconnected through joint ownership of partially privatized property created conditions for mutual influence. The balance of such influence shifted over time. In the 1990s, relationships between business and the state were described as "state capture" (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2003) . After 2000, when political leaders gained strength and obtained broad public support, relationships shifted to "business capture" as political leaders leveraged their powerful position by dictating the conditions of continuing partnership with private actors (Yakovlev, 2006) .
Variation and Evolution of State Control in Other Transition Economies
SOEs with Partial State Ownership. Research on SOEs in transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in former Soviet republics (CIS countries) has primarily concerned challenges associated with privatization and restructuring (Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & Hitt, 2003) , governance structures (Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000) , and more recently, divergent paths in transition (Lane & Myant, 2007) , and European integration (Hashi, Welfens, & Wziatek-Kubiak, 2007) . Indirect State Ownership Control. Similar to Russia, indirect state ownership is quite common in CEE and CIS countries. The state often created multiple institutions through which to exercise control, such as investment funds or pension funds (Pahor, Prasnikar, & Ferligoj, 2004) . The state also maintained control over some financial and industrial groups, which in turn controlled individual firms (Kočenda & Hanousek, 2012) .
Means of State Control beyond Ownership.
Financial support through government loans was common in CEE and CIS economies, similar to Russia and China (Mickiewicz, 2010) . However, in these economies, ruling political parties did not exercise direct control over firms through governance structures similar to China's Party Committees. Similar to Russia and China, the state in other transition economies frequently executed veto rights through golden shares to prevent entry by new shareholders or to block the sale of property (Kočenda & Hanousek, 2012) .
Networks of Private and State Actors. Partial privatization in CEE produced many firms with mixed private and state ownership described as "recombinant property" by Stark (1996) . Several studies analyzed privatized firms not as isolated economic units but as nodes in corporate networks created by the relationships of control and interdependence (Pahor et al., 2004) . These dense corporate networks connected domestic owners, foreign owners, and the state thus blurring boundaries between private and state ownership. In many firms, the state assumed the role of a passive shareholder by letting private partners take control (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 1999) . In others, the state was quite active, with the relationships between state and private shareholders ranging from mutually beneficial cooperation to hostile battles for control.
CEE minimized opportunities for rent-seeking activities of the ruling elite by reducing major distortions of government policies and liberalizing prices (Havrylyshyn, 2006) .
Oligarchs played a more prominent role in CIS countries, where they were connected with the state either through upper-echelon nomenclature or relatives and close associates of the countries' presidents. In other former Soviet republics, the 'revolving door' between the government and business was often even more pronounced than in Russia; for example, only recently an oligarch in food products, Mr. Poroshenko, became President of Ukraine. Further, across all CIS countries, there was considerable continuity from the political power leaders of the Soviet period to the oligarchs.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES
Board Composition and Independence
The notion and functions of independent directors vary remarkably across different jurisdictions (Ferrarini & Filippelli, 2014) . In China, all listed companies are required to have at least one third of independent directors on their boards and, if board committees are established, that proportion should be raised to at least half (Clarke, 2006; Zhao, 2011) . The role of independent directors in Chinese audit committees is negligible (Liu & Pissler, 2013) .
As to nomination and remuneration committees, the corporate governance code recommends a composition based on a majority of independent directors. However, the influence of such committees on decisions about executive compensation is also modest. The positive relationship between board independence and firm operating performance is stronger in state controlled firms relative to other listed firms in China as it reduces tunneling and improves investment efficiency in SOEs (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015) . Former government officials comprise a large share of outside board members in Chinese firms (Chen, 2015) .
Several studies examine the effect of political connections at the board level (Liang et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2007; Zheng et al., 2014; Cull et al., 2015) .
The Russian corporate governance code recommends that boards comprise at least one-third of independent directors. It also recommends that audit committees consist entirely of independent directors or are chaired by an independent director and include only nonexecutives. Board composition may affect investments in productive assets. For Russian publicly traded firms, Grosman and Wright (2015) find a positive effect of cash-flows on capital expenditures when SOEs appoint independent board directors to assume the role of monitoring. However, these positive effects are substantially reduced when oligarchs appoint independent directors indicating that independent directors are afforded insufficient autonomy to play their monitoring role. The authors find foreign independent directors to be influential, while foreign affiliated directors exercise little influence on tunneling.
The adoption of best corporate governance practices in state-controlled firms remains quite limited. According to a recent study by the Russian Institute of Directors (2014) 
Transparency and Disclosure
An important question concerns whether state control is associated with higher or lower degree of transparency and disclosure. Relative to other facets of corporate governance, voluntary disclosure by Russian SOEs is higher, but still lags behind the level of disclosure in publicly traded firms without the controlling state shareholder (Russian Institute of Directors, 2014). Partially-owned SOEs have higher disclosure than wholly-owned SOEs. In Russia, SOEs are more sensitive than oligarch-owned enterprises to improved transparency as demonstrated by its effect on fixed investments (Grosman, 2015) . Closer ties to foreign multinationals can improve transparency; for example, such ties lead to greater wage reporting in Russian companies (Braguinsky & Mityakov, 2015) .
In China, SOEs face strong incentives to voluntarily disclose additional information to ease investor concerns regarding management quality, the risk of tunneling, and the role of government as major shareholder (Wang, Sewon, & Claiborne, 2008) . However, lack of emphasis on efficiency and profitability by state shareholders or their direct access to corporate information might undermine the need for voluntary disclosure. The empirical results are mixed: some demonstrate that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of state ownership (Wang et al., 2008) , particularly for those SOEs with foreign listings (Ferguson, Lam, & Lee, 2002) , while others report no significant relation (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007) or a negative relation between the two constructs (Xiao, Yang, & Chow, 2004) . There are indications that China's SOEs manage earnings to boost their chances of being selected for IPOs because earnings performance is a government-stated criterion for listing (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000) .
In China, informal institutions often substitute for ineffective formal corporate governance institutions (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2008) . Both firm owners and local governments are motivated to foster economic growth and both will do whatever necessary to achieve this. This means de facto enforcement of ownership rights and various types of regulation. In contrast, in Russia, formal institutions are undermined through corruption and lack of enforcement and government often does not have mutually complementary goals with large shareholders -there is oftentimes an antagonistic relationship between state and oligarchs with state interventions taking the form of arbitrary inspections and asset stripping aided by lack of court independence (Estrin & Prevezer, 2010) . The Russian government often interferes in business affairs through selectively applying and enforcing formal rules toward firms and owners (Adachi, 2013) .
Executive Compensation
Studies of executive compensation in SOEs of transition economies are rare. The legacy of communism constrained CEO pay in the early stages of economic reforms (Firth et al., 2006) and there is generally a relatively small pay gap between organization levels in SOEs (Chen, Ezzamel, & Cai, 2011) .The average salary of a manager in a Chinese SOE was only one-fifth of a manager's salary in a foreign MNE, but this gap is closing (Wooldridge, 2012) . Pay-forperformance incentive schemes emerged as the profit objective took hold in SOEs. Average There may be other influences on executive behavior than compensation. Executive positions in listed SOEs are filled by state bureaucrats rather than professional managers, and are steps in the career of a successful civil servant (Morck et al., 2008) . For those with real control but little personal ownership in their company, supporting unprofitable, but politically important projects is a good strategy for career advancement in the state echelons. Executive performance evaluations and promotion decisions are oftentimes still based on whether the managers act in the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (Firth et al., 2006) . CEO duality in Chinese SOEs is relatively rare. The board chairman, acting as the legal representative of the firm according to the Company Law, is usually appointed by the state as the largest shareholder (Jiang & Kim, 2015) .
In general, governments in transition economies have embraced corporate governance mechanisms based on shareholder rights as an alternative to direct intervention in management of SOEs that was a norm in centrally-planned economies. However, statecontrolled firms in transition economies often lag in adopting best corporate governance practices intended to protect interests of minority shareholders.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We summarized the range of theories used to study state control in Table 1 . While this range is broad, agency theory (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton et al., 2008) and, more recently, institutional theory (Child & Juan, 1997; Suhomlinova, 1999; Puffer & McCarthy, 2011) are the most used in the context of transition economies. Only a few recent studies on SOEs in transition economies rely on novel theoretical frameworks (e.g., Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012) . Further research on SOEs in transition economies should put more emphasis on developing theoretical frameworks that take into account unique challenges faced by state-controlled firms to address questions about state control and corporate governance summarized in Table 5 . Table 5 about here
Means of State Control
State control over enterprises of strategic importance takes different forms and has different consequences as researchers have just started to explore (Musacchio et al., 2015) . Modern Dependence on the state creates opportunities for exercising influence beyond firms where the state is a shareholder. Through its leverage over key actors in business groups, the state can exercise influence over other business group members. Growth of such business groups meant that new firms were added to the network of interconnected private and state actors; joining this network brought these firms into the state's sphere of influence (Guthrie, Okhmatovskiy, Schoenman, & Xiao, 2012) . The role of the state in creating and promoting business groups in transition economies deserves more attention among scholars of state capitalism. Transaction cost theory may, for example, yield insights into the effects of such state interference on firm behavior. Conceptual analyses of the relative benefits to private actors of autonomous versus integrated forms of public-private partnerships (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012) provide the basis for future empirical studies of private-public governance arrangements in transition economies. Further, the variety of private-public ownership forms we have identified may provide scope for the development of a more contingent approach to private-public sector governance.
Private and state actors are also connected through networks of political ties (Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012; Danis, Chiaburu, & Lyles, 2010) . Despite significant progress in building market institutions, political ties continue to play a critical role in transition economies. The political embeddedness perspective emphasizes that connections with politicians serving an instrumental function for the firm can also be leveraged by these politicians to constrain firms' strategic choices, while state control ties also provide firms with an opportunity to influence state actors. Given the prominence of political ties in China and Russia, it is not surprising that most studies about political embeddedness have been conducted in these transition economies (Okhmatovskiy, 2010 It is difficult to capture mechanisms of informal influence in empirical studies.
Studies have usually relied on self-reported evidence obtained through surveys of top managers (Yakovlev, 2009 Preferential treatment and selective punitive actions are frequently observed in transition economies, implying that state officials have plenty of opportunities to exercise influence over firms using informal mechanisms. Further research on such mechanisms is needed to complement existing evidence on formal mechanisms of state control -this is essential for understanding how the state exercises control over firms in transition economies.
Corporate Governance Structures and Processes
According to the resource-based view (Makhija, 2003; Lazzarini, 2015) , an important issue is not just the monitoring role of boards but also the value adding role of directors due to their human and social capital. Research on the role of directors' international experience in transition economies remains limited. Further research is needed on the extent to which transition economy firms recruit overseas directors or expatriates, who can provide the international expertise required. Studies have emphasized the importance of board connections to government agencies, but we have little analysis of the evolution of these relationships. Expectations that the relevance of such social capital would decline over time need to be examined through longitudinal studies of board composition and processes.
Important questions concern the extent to which social capital associated with political ties has declined or metamorphosed over time.
There is relatively little analysis of how state involvement on boards affects board processes. Notwithstanding challenges regarding access to board operations, which researchers in developed economies have overcome (Pye, 2013) , fine-grained studies of board processes in firms operating with different configurations of state control will likely be highly insightful. Finally, studies of board interlocks involving networks of SOEs and private firms (Salvaj & Couyoumdjian, 2015) could be validated in transition economies.
SOEs can outsource regulation of corporate governance practices to developed economies by listing on foreign exchanges or by acquiring foreign assets. Several studies on cross-listings of foreign firms on Western exchanges observe improved corporate governance standards and performance of foreign firms as they 'bond' to a better governance and regulatory regime (Khanna, Palepu, & Srinivasan, 2004; Ferguson et al., 2002; Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014) (Liang et al., 2015; Choudhury & Khanna, 2014; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014; Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997; White, 2000; Zeng, Douglas, & Wu, 2013) as moderating effects of foreign listings. Further, the role of foreign MNEs entering transition economies as agents of change in state control and corporate governance (Meyer & Lieb-Doczy, 2003) may be a fruitful avenue to explore.
Outsourcing corporate governance regulation may increase accountability and transparency as most SOEs adopted IFRS standards and appointed international audit firms (Grosman & Leiponen, 2013) . Researchers could compare transparency and disclosure practices of SOEs in transition economies and developed economies using institutional theory since the nature of such practices may be affected by institutional environment. Specific areas for study might include misrepresenting financial results or withholding information about shareholders' identities and board members' backgrounds and affiliations (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011) .
There is a shortage of research on Top Management Team (TMT) selection and compensation in SOEs, primarily due to data scarcity and non-disclosure. However, we see the following trends emerging regarding TMT selection mechanisms: 1) appointment of trusted state officials to top management positions, making them ultra-powerful state 'nominees'; 2) appointments of the new generation of sophisticated managers who learned about business in the world's best business schools, worked abroad and were exposed to better governance practices and business ethics than their predecessors (Wooldridge, 2012) .
However, the latter category of managers may only fulfill technical or operational roles, with decision making being made at the level of state shareholder.
Future studies should consider how SOEs can attract new talent given competition with compensation and benefits offered by domestic private firms and MNEs. Further research can explore how equity-linked long-term incentives of top managers influence decision making at SOEs. A formal theory is needed to distinguish the use of equity-linked compensation to solve principal-agent problems from the use of such compensation to resolve conflicting interests of state and private shareholders.
Contextual Factors
Transition economies were not homogeneous in 1989 and are even less homogeneous now.
Some have progressed to become EU members, while others have progressed little or even regressed after initial reforms. This variety is vividly illustrated in Hoskisson et al.'s (2013) analysis that categorizes emerging economies, including transition economies, into five different clusters according to their institutional and infrastructure development. Further research is needed to analyze the relationships between the evolution of state control and institutional development. For example, recent studies demonstrate how home country institutional contextual factors complement or substitute for director human and social capital and there is a need to apply this analysis to the role of state directors.
In transition economies, managers have relied excessively on informal institutions due to weak formal institutions. Continuing reliance on informal institutions under conditions of formal institutional voids creates major obstacles for badly needed reforms (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011) . A specific contextual issue requiring further analysis concerns the problem of corruption in the governance of firms with some element of state control. Governments in transition economies have made moves to tackle corruption by removing and imprisoning implicated government officials, often after changes in ruling cliques. Such changes will affect firms closely connected to the former officials. Analyses of the effects of removing corrupt officials and politicians on the firms closely associated with them would likely yield interesting insights. Such issues suggest scope for the development and application of political embeddedness and institutional perspectives.
CONCLUSION
Twenty five years on from 1989, SOEs in transition economies are far from the centrallyplanned behemoths and state control has evolved into different organizational and governance forms. Recent studies on state controlled firms in transition economies, other than China and Russia, are rare. This omission is unfortunate since these economies have become more diverse and continue to change. We encourage context-specific research on SOEs to understand the evolution of state control in particular countries, as well as comparative research, which can provide insights into whether state capitalism varies between transition economies. If so, insights generated are context-bound. Both context-specific and comparative studies could provide opportunities to extend mainstream theory by examining interfaces between theory and context, by both contextualizing theory and theorizing about context. With this review, we lay the foundation for such further examination.
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1992-1994
Mass privatization
Voucher privatization begins 1992. Monetary privatization begins 1994.
State releases control over SOEs in sectors not considered strategic. Some completely privatized, others -partially privatized. 1995
Loans-for-shares privatization begins
Privatization of large enterprises in most attractive sectors of the Russian economy through "loans-forshares" auctions.
State releases control over some "jewels" of the national economy, most engaged in extraction of natural resources and generating significant revenues from export. 1996
Law on Corporations and Law on Securities are enacted
Creating legal basis for operation of stock markets. Large partially-privatized SOEs become blue chips of Russian stock market while state retained majority stakes.
1998
Financial crisis, default on government debt
Government default and devaluation of ruble led to sharp decline in imports and prompted development of local producers.
Many SOEs on verge of bankruptcy since mid-1990s benefited from increasing demand for local products after 1998 crisis -became viable, made investments, but needed to improve efficiency. SOEs in oil, gas, and defense industries suffered from the imposed sanctions.
Transparency and Disclosure
What are the similarities and differences in transparency and disclosure practices between different transition economies and developed economies? What drives these differences? How does the enforcement and application of transparency and disclosure practices vary between different transition economies? How does the enforcement and application of transparency and disclosure practices vary between different types of state ownership / affiliation and private sector enterprises?
Executive Compensation
How does executive compensation in state-owned / affiliated enterprises in transition economies differ from executive compensation in non-state firms and in enterprises from non-transition economies? How does the status of state-owned / affiliated enterprises in transition economies affect the scope of executive compensation mechanisms available?
Evolution of Governance Mechanisms
How have governance mechanisms and processes evolved in state-owned / affiliated enterprises in different types of transition economies and what has been the impact upon enterprises in these economies? To what extent do the presence and roles of politically connected directors in state-owned / affiliated enterprises change as transition economies evolve?
